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NOTES AND COMMENTS
employees work on the blueprints and drawings which are used by con-
tractors to improve such facilities of interstate commerce, one step re-
moved. The work of these employees is so directly and vitally related to
the functioning of a facility of interstate commerce, however, as to be, in
practical effect, a part of it rather than isolated local activity. The
clerks and stenographers were as much an aid in preparing the blue-
prints and drawings as were the fieldmen and draftsmen because all
were necessary for the final product.
While enlarging the "in commerce" section, the Court refused to
deal with the "production of goods" question presented to them by the
Fourth Circuit. From this refusal, a negative implication may be drawn
that the Court is restricting the "production of goods" section in con-
formity with the intentions of the 1949 Amendments.' 8
RiciHaD G. BADmEr
CoNNm E. BOLDEN
Railway Labor Act-Rights of Minority Groups to Membership in
Labor Union Acting as Statutory Bargaining Agent
Several Negro firemen employed by various southern railroads
brought a class action in federal court, seeking admission to member-
ship in the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, their
statutory bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act. Negro
firemen are excluded from membership in the Brotherhood because its
constitution limits membership to applicants "white born." Held, that
the action be dismissed. The Brotherhood is a private association whose
membership policies are not subject to judicial control; the plaintiffs have
failed to show that an agency of the federal government is responsible
for their plight.'
The great majority of unions in this country do not practice racial
discrimination in membership. 2 At least thirty-nine union constitutions,
" These changed the words "necessary" to "closely related and directly
essential" as a limitation upon the "fringe area" under the production clause. 29
C.F.R. § 776.17(a) (1958) (The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of
the U.S. Department of Labor has accepted this legislative history to the effect
that the 1949 amendment is intended to narrow the scope of coverage under the
"engaged in production of goods for commerce" clause.) See 95 Cong. Rec. 14880(1949) (remarks of Senator Taft). 95 Cong. Rec. 11001 (1949) (remarks of Con-
gressman Lucas).
1 Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q.J. Ecox. 66-107 (1946).
See generally, NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (2d ed. 1944). As
one of its "Objects and Principles," the AFL-CIO in its constitution undertakes
"to encourage all workers without regard to race, creed, or color or national origin
to share in the full benefits of union organization." AFL-CIO CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
This provision was criticized on the grounds that it did not recognize the right
of all persons to "full membershp" in trade unions. HANDBOOK OF UNION GovERN-
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covering 4,320,551 persons, contain specific provisions which require
that all persons qualified for membership are to be admitted without re-
gard to their race, creed, or color.3 The constitution of the United
Steel Workers of America, for example, provides that "all working men
and working women, regardless of race, creed, or color, or nationality
.. are eligible to membership."'4 This seems to be the general practice
among industrial unions.5 A substantial minority of unions, however,
generally limited to skilled craft and railroad unions, continue to exclude
Negroes and certain other racial groups either by explicit provision or
by general practice.6 The big-four railroad brotherhoods, which control
most of the workers in the operating department of the major railroads,
have explicit constitutional prohibitions which bar Negroes from mem-
bership.7 These four brotherhoods have a combined membership of
414,197.8 Some unions do not exclude Negroes entirely, but relegate
them to inferior locals, under the jurisdiction of adjoining white locals.0
Others, especially in the South, simply maintain "separate but equal"
locals for whites and non-whites.' 0
Though the number of unions with racial discriminatory policies is
numerically small, the problem is of considerable importance because of
MENT STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD 17(1955). For the full text of the AFL-CIO constitution as ratified by the AFL-
CIO convention, December 5, 1955, see 36 L.R.R.M. 164 (1956). The AFL-CIO
has taken some concrete steps toward eliminating racial discrimination in union
membership. Hutchinson, The Constitution and Government of the AFL-CIO, 46
CALIF. L. Rav. 739, 743 & n. 10 (1958).
' HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 64. The 194 unions covered by the survey
have a declared membership of 17,513,798, approximately 163/2 million of whom
are in the United States. Id. at 7.
'Id. at 64.
The CIO, organized on an industrial basis, has made non-discrimination one
of its basic principles, and has countenanced no internationals which exclude
workers because of color or race. NORTHRUP, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-16. No
CIO union has a constitutional prohibition barring Negroes and other racial
minorities. Fourteen unions, with nearly half of the CIO membership, have con-
stitutional provisions containing anti-discrimination clauses. HANDBOOK, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 63, Tables 30 and 31.
' A survey of 185 international unions revealed that 32 unions with a total
membership of 2,500,000 excluded Negroes either by constitutional provision or
established practice. Summers, supra note 2.
1 HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 64. A similar provision in the consti-
tution of the National Postal Transport Association, limiting membership to
"Caucasians or North American Indians only," was recently repealed. AFL-CIO
News, Oct. 4, 1958, p. 6, col. 4.
' Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 77,197; Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, 100,000; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 205,000;
and Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, 32,000. SouRcEBoOK OF UNION
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE
BOARD 218-219 (1956).
' Summers, rupra note 2, at 69. For some cases involving such auxiliary locals,
see, James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944) ; Betts v. Easley,
161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
10 HANDBOOK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 17. See, e.g., Davis v. Brotherhood of
Ry. Carmen, 272 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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the nature of the unions involved. The skilled craft unions and the rail-
road brotherhoods are among the most powerful unions in the United
States and control many of the higher paying and more desirable jobs.11
The Importance of Membership in the Union
Under the Railway Labor Act,12 the majority of employees of a craft
or class elect a bargaining representative for the entire craft or class.
This representative, usually a laboi union, is then certified by the Na-
tional Mediation Board. Once such a union is certified, it becomes the
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the unit.'3 The
individual employee loses all freedom to make his own contract or to bar-
gain in his own behalf. The compulsory power of the statutory bar-
gaining union extends both to the making of the collective bargaining
contract and, in practice, to the .settlement of all grievances arising
under the contract.14 In the negotiation and administration of the col-
lective bargaining contract, the conflicting interests of different groups
are resolved, and the available gains distributed among the various
workers. Since the non-union worker cannot attend meetings of the
union or vote for the union officials who negotiate and administer the
collective bargaining contract, he cannot be assured that his interests
will always be protected.'8 This is especially true where all of the
members of a minority race are excluded frorri the union.16
Court decisions have made it clear that a union certified as the statu-
tory bargaining representative must fairly represent both its members
and non-members.' 7 However, the history of the railway labor move-
ment shows that the all-white brotherhoods have not only failed fairly to
represent the interests of the non-member Negroes, but have sought,
through overt and covert means, to drive them from their jobs.'8 The
1 See generally, NORTHRUP, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6-34, 49-100, 211-17, 233,
234. For a detailed analysis of the effects of discrimination in economic terms, see
BEcKER, THE EcoNomics OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
'"44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1952).
1 "The minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute of the
right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a representative of their own,
and its members cannot bargain individually on behalf of themselves as to matters
which are properly the subject of collective bargaining." Steele v. Louisville &
N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944), citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
1 For a discussion of the character of collective bargaining, see Summers, The
Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 610 (1958).
21"(T)he union is the workers' sole spokesman in this process of industrial
government which so completely regulates his working life. The union makes
critical choices which bind him and control his very 'livelihood, and his only voice
of preference or protest is within the union." Id. at 617.
1" Raugh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874 (1957)
Hewitt, The Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 919(1951); Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 43 (1947).
17 See 36 N.C.L. REv. 529 (1958) for a discussion of these cases.
18 The late Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit, Judge John J. Parker, in a case
involving one of the collective bargaining contracts negotiated by the Locomotive
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remedy envisioned by the Court in'Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. 19 and
related cases has not put an end to the abuses which the Court recog-
nized as existing.20
Remedy: Fair Employment Practices Commissions
Perhaps the most effective remedy in dealing with the problem of
racial discrimination in union membership has been the state Fair Em-
ployment Practice Laws.21 Several states have legislation creating spe-
cialized commissions which have as one of their purposes the elimi-
nation of discrimination in employment.22 These statutes generally make
Firemen (BLFE), traced a portion of this history as follows:
(T) he record in the case before us ... makes [it] clear that the agreement
of February 18, 1941, was obtained in the course of a campaign which had
been conducted by the Brotherhood for a number of years to eliminate
Negro firemen from the service of the railroads. Prior to 1919, when the
first collective bargaining agreement was negotiated by the Brotherhood, at
least 85% of the locomotive firemen on the defendant railroad were Negroes.
Although there had been agitation by thi Brotherhood prior to that time
for the elimination of Negroes from the service, the agitation seems to have
become more effective when the Brotherhood was recognized as bargaining
agent, and in 1927 it secured an agreement that one-third of the firemen
should be promotable or white firemen. Two years later, in 1929, this pro-
portion was raised by agreement to 50%. Later, following a campaign
openly designed to get rid eventually of all the Negro firemen, the agreement
here complained of was negotiated; and today only 357o of the firemen in the
service of defendant railroad are Negroes. Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 476 (4th Cir. 1951).
For the history of racial discrimination in trade unions, see NORTHRUP, ORGAN-
iza LAB oR AND THE NEGRO, supra note 2.
"'323 U.S. 192 (1944).
'0 Consider the Supreme Court's comments on the activities of the BLFE several
years after the decision in Steele, supra note 19: "It is needless to recite additional
details of the present case. What it adds to the governing facts of the earlier cases
is a continuing and willful disregard of rights which this Court in unmistakable
terms has said must be accorded to Negro firemen." Graham v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 234 (1949).
"For studies of the various state anti-discrimination commissions, see: 3 RACE
IRL. L. REp. 1085-1108 (1958) ; Meiners, Fair Employment Practices Legislation,62 Dicx. L. Rnv. 31-69 (1957); STAFF OF SUBcomm. ON LABOR AND LABOR MAN-
AGEMFENT RELATIONS, SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 82D CONG.,2
D SEss., STATE AND MUNICIPAL FAIR EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION (Comm. Print
1952).22 ALAS.A COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 43-5-1 to -10 (Cum. Supp. 1958) ; COLO. REV.
STAT. AiNN. §§ 80-24-1 to -8 (Supp. 1957); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7400-07 (Supp.
1955) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 214.1-.5 (Smith-Hurd 1953) ; IND. ANN. STAT.§§ 40-2301 to -2306 (1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to -1008 (Supp.
1957); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B J§ 1-10 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 17,
56 (1952); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.151C, §§ 1-5 (1957) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.458(1)- (11) (Supp. 1957) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.13 (1957) ; Mo. SEss. LAWS 1957, S.C.S.H.B. 125, at 299;
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-25-1 to -28 (Supp. 1957) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-4-1 to
-14 (1953) ; N.Y. ExEcUTIvE LAW §§ 290-301; N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 313; ORE. REv.STAT. §§ 651.010-.030, 659.010-.990 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963(Supp. 1957) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -39 (1956) ; WASH. REv. CODE§§ 49.60.010-.320 (1957); Wis. STAT. §§ 15.85, 15.855 (1957) (Governors Com-
mission on Human Rights) ; Wis. STAT. §§ 101.02-06, 111.31-.37 (1957) (Industrial
Commission). Two new states have recently enacted FEPC bills-Califoria and
Ohio. Both laws ban discriminatory practices by labor organizations and both have
enforcement provisions. AFL-CIO News, Apr. 25, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
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unlawful certain practices of labor organizations, notably, denying mem-
bership to members of minority groups on the basis of race, religion,
color or national origin, expelling such persons from membership, or
discriminating against them in any manner.m Some of these commis-
sions use the "education" approach alone, 24 while others have the power
to use "enforcement" procedures when persuasion fails.25 Although the
enforcement procedures are seldom employed, 26 their importance is not
to be underestimated. Experience has shown that better results are
obtained by persuasion backed up by the right to go into court and get
a cease and desist order.27
In the limited area in which they operate, the Fair Employment
Practice laws are a satisfactory remedy.28 However, since they extend
only to state boundaries, and only a few states have such laws, the prob-
lem still remains a national one. Also, it is extremely unlikely that
such laws will ever be enacted in any of the Southeastern states.2 9
"' See, e.g., this provision of the Alaska Code:
(I)t shall be an unlawful employment practice:
2. For a labor organization, because of the race, religion, color or national
origin of any individual to exclude or to expel from its membership such
individual or to discriminate in any way against any of its members or against
any employer or any individual.employed by the employer. ALASKA CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 43-5-4 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
' Ill., Ind., Kan., Md., and Mo. The "education" approach involves a process
of informing the public of the scope of the protection against discrimination
afforded by the law and of persuading the public to avoid discriminatory practices.
The Kansas statute, for instance, merely empowers its commission "to discourage
discrimination in employment because of race, religion, color, national origin or
ancestry, either by employers, labor organizations, employment agencies or other
persons as hereinafter provided." KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1003 (Supp. 1957).
"Alaska, Colo., Conn., Mass., Mich., Minn., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ore., Pa., R.I.,
Wash., Wis. By "enforcement" power is meant the authority to issue an order
requiring one who has been found to be acting in a discriminatory manner to cease
and desist from such unlawful practice In these states, the commission may
secure a court decree for enforcement of its orders. 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1085
(1958).
"A study of six thousand cases handled over a period of seven years by ten
operating commissions shows that only seven culminated in formal hearings and
only two of these actually reached the courts. Leland, We Believe in Employment
on Merit, But ... , 37 MINN. L. REv. 246, 262 (1953).
" Ibid. "It is significant that four states that began with laws designed to
secure voluntary compliance have shifted over to laws with enforcement pro-
visions. It is interesting to contrast the results achieved under the New York
law, which can be enforced, and the Federal FEP which could not. Under the
latter certain railroad unions not only refused to alter their policies of Negro ex-
clusion, but also refused even to attend the hearings to which the commission called
them. In New York they have eliminated the discrimination and admit members
without regard to color." Meiners, supra note 21, at 37.
" Note that within two years after the New York Law Against Discrimina-
tion became effective, racial restrictive clauses in the constitutions of the railroad
brotherhoods were either removed or made inoperative in the state of New York,
and later, in all states having laws prohibiting such discrimination. Carter, Prac-
tical Consideration of Anti-Discrimination Legislation--Experience Under the New,
York Law Against Discrimination, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 40, 51-52 (1954).
" None of these states have what could be called a fair employment practice
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The only federal Fair Employment Practice Committee, established
by executive order in 1941,30 had no real enforcement power.31 Though
it closed nearly 5,000 cases during its five year existence, 8 2 the Com-
mittee was ineffective against the discriminatory practices of the great
railroad brotherhoods.3 3  Other executive commissions established by
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower are generally limited to discrimina-
tion in government service and government contracts.3 4  Congress has
never enacted a federal Fair Employment Practice Law, and the prob-
abilities of its doing so in the near future appear very slight.85
Administrative Remedy
Controversies between an employee or group of employees and a
carrier or carriers arising out of collective bargaining agreements in
the railway industry are decided by the National Railroad Adjustment
Board. 6 The Adjustment Board is composed of thirty-six members,
one-half of whom are selected by the rail carriers and the other half by
the labor unions. The awards of the Adjustment Board are final and
binding upon the parties to the dispute, except in so far as they contain
money awards.37 Thus, if a party succeeds in getting his case before
act. Consider, rather, a South Carolina statute which provides a penalty of up to$100 for permitting persons of different races to work together within the same
room in Textile Mills. S.C. CODE § 40-452 (1952).
"°Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
"1 The Commission was limited to receiving complaints, investigating them,
and making recommendations. The Commission could have recommended that
parties refusing to cease discriminatory practices should have their war contracts
cancelled, but apparently this procedure was not followed. Meiners, supra note
21, at 54.
" Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 842 (1947).
NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO 74-75 (2d ed. 1944). The
railroad brotherhoods were not alone in defying the Committee. Twenty-six of 35
orders issued by the commission to employers were not complied with; of 10 orders
issued to trade unions, only one complied. Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 842
(1947).
"'A Fair Employment Board within the Civil Service Commission was estab-
lished by President Truman to prevent discrimination in government service.
Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1948). President Eisenhower replaced
this with the "President's Committee on Government Employment Policy." Exec.
Order No. 10590, 20 Fed. Reg. 409 (1955). President Truman also established the
"Committee on Government Contract Compliance," Exec. Order No. 10308, 16 Fed.
Reg. 12303 (1951), to improve means of obtaining compliance with the require-
ment that nondiscrimination clauses be put in government contracts. This has
been continued and strengthened by President Eisenhower. See Exec. Order No.
10557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (1954). For a study of these nondiscrimination clauses,
see Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts. 43 VA. L. REV.
837 (1957).
" The most advanced step in this direction made by Congress was the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 STAT. 634 (1957). This is not closely com-
parable to the state FEP laws and is concerned primarily with the right to vote.
See Comment, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 619 (1958).
" Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952) ; ADmIN-
ISTRATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT BY THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD,
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFicE 26-29 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATION
OF THE RAILWAY LABOR AcT].
" ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR Acr, supra note 36, at 29.
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the board and loses, he has no right of appeal. This Board, composed
of partisans, one-half of whom are appointed by organizations which
do not afford Negroes equal status, is an ineffective remedy for Negro
employees seeking redress against the discriminatory practices of the
railroad brotherhoods. s
The National Mediation Board has the authority to resolve dis-
putes among employees as to the designation of the bargaining represent-
ative for a particular craft or class.3 9 Unlike the Adjustment Board, the
National Mediation Board is an independent agency unaffected by par-
tisan interests.40 However, it has not provided an effective remedy
against racial discrimination in the railroad industry.41
The National Labor Relations Board has refused to establish bar-
gaining units based on race42 and has ruled that the segregation of white
and Negro employees into separate locals is not per se a form of racial
discrimination. 43  In several cases, the Board has given warning that
it will consider revoking certification of a union which denies "adequate
representation" to all employees in the bargaining unit for which it has
exclusive representation.44 However, it appears that the Board has not
found the facts of any case sufficient to justify revoking any union cer-
tification.45 Apparently, the Board's present position is that discrimina-
tory admission policies of a union will not be considered in determining
the appropriate bargaining unit.46
"For a particularly critical review of some of the Adjustment Board's de-
cisions, see NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO, supra note 2, at 66-71,
101, 248-249.
" ADmINIsRATioN OF THE RAILWAY LABOR AcT, supra note 36, at 11, 14-25.
40 The Board is composed of three members appointed by the President of the
United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Board has a staff
of mediators in the field, all of whom are selected through civil service. Id. at 11.
"I NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 100. See Brotherhood of Ry. & SS. Clerks v.
United Transp. Serv. Employees, 137 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1943), ree'd on other
grounds, 320 U.S. 715 (1943).
42 United States Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382, 388 (1943) (union admitted
both whites and Negroes without discrimination, but skilled whites were out-
numbered in an industrial unit by skilled Negroes).
'" Atlantic Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973 (1945).
"Id. at 975-76; General Motors Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 427, 431 (1945); South-
eastern Portland Cement Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1219 (1945) ("equal representa-
tion") ; Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804, 806 (1944) ("equal representation").
"n See Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs,
44 ILL. L. REv. 425, 439 (1949).
40 See Balaban and Katz (Princess Theatre), 87 N.L.R.B. 107 (1949) ; Norfolk
So. Bus Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 115 (1949) (employer cited for refusal to bargain with
a local of the Machinists; employer defended on the grounds that it could not be
required to bargain with the local because a majority of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit were Negroes and therefore not eligible for membership in the union.
This defense was not sustained.) ; Aaron and Komaroff, supra note 45, at 438-46.
This view finds some support in § 158 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which
makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain employees in
the exercise of certain rights, but provides that "this paragaph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein." 61 Stat 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) 1(A)
1959]
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Remedy: Judicial
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the question
whether a member of a racially excluded group may demand admittance
to a union acting as the exclusive bargaining representative for the class
of which he is a member.47 The Supreme Court of California, in a line
of cases beginning with James v. Marinship Corporation,4" has held that
where the union has a closed shop agreement with the employer, it can-
not maintain an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union, but must
admit to full membership those of a minority race if they are otherwise
qualified.49  The Supreme Court of Kansas has held that the denial of
full membership privileges in the statutory bargaining representative cer-
tified under the Railway Labor Act is a violation of rights guaranteed
by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. 0 In contrast,
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas refused to order plaintiffs admitted
to a white local of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America where
the Brotherhood maintained a "separate but equal" local for Negro em-
ployees. 51 And, in a recent Wisconsin case,52 the court refused to order
a bricklayers' union to admit persons excluded from membership solely
because of race. This case is of particular importance because it in-
volves the Wisconsin Fair Employment Statute. The Commission had
conducted hearings and recommended that the union admit the plaintiffs
to membership. The court held that the recommendations of the Com-
(1952). Compare this express statutory provision with Justice Stone's dictum in
the Steele case, referring to the Railway Labor Act: "While the statute does not
deny to suwh a bargainhig labor organization the right to determine eligibility to
its membership, it does require the union, in collective baragining and in making
contracts with the carrier, to represent non-union or minority union members of
the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith."
(Emphasis added.) Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
"" In the representation cases, although it was recognized that Negroes were
not members of the union involved, whether or not they could demand admittance to
the union was not directly passed on. The representation cases dealt with the duty
of the union toward employees once it became the statutory bargaining representa-
tive. See note 17 supra.
"25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
"See, e.g., Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
49 Cal. 2d 638, 320 P.2d 494 (1958), modifying and afflrming 149 Cal. Adv. App.
116, 307 P.2d 1026 (App. Dep't 1957); Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 88
Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P2d 400 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Williams v. International
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946) ; Bautista v. Jones, 25
Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944).
" Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). Here the plaintiffs were
Negro workmen employed in the railway shops of an interstate carrier. The plain-
tiff's allegations that they were denied equal privileges of participation and repre-
sentation in matters within the purview of the National Railway Act and assigned
to separate lodges under the jurisdiction of the while local were held to state a
cause of acton. The court said that the actions complained of constituted a viola-
tion of individual rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment and that injunction was
a proper remedy if the facts were proved.
"Davis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen of America, 272 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954).
1 " Rbss v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
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mission were not judicially enforceable 5 3 and that the action of the
union was not state action so as to subject it to the requirements of the
fourteenth amendment.5 4
In the principal case, the court neither discussed nor cited any of the
above cases. Though all of them are perhaps distinguishable from
Oliphant,5 5 Betts v. Easley56 is strikingly similar to the principal case
on its facts. Both cases involved railway labor unions charged with a
statutory duty of representing the employees bringing the suits. In
both cases the essential wrong is the denial of the right to participate in
union affairs incident to employment. In both cases the denial was
based solely on race. Only the method chosen was different. If the
partial exclusion of the Betts case was unlawful, certainly the present
case is stronger on the facts for the plaintiffs, since their status is one of
total exclusion.
It is submitted that the Kansas Court in Betts took a more realistic
attitude toward the denial of full membership privileges than did the
Sixth Circuit in the principal case. It would seem that the same reasons
which prohibit a union acting as statutory bargaining agent from negoti-
ating a racially discriminatory contract should also prohibit it from
arbitrarily denying membership privileges to a group of the employees
it represents; also, that a union which derives its exclusive power to
represent a class by virtue of a federal statute cannot excuse its discrim-
inatory admission policies on the grounds that it is a private voluntary
organization. In denying relief to the plaintiffs in the principal case,
the court has failed to forge the missing link in the chain of judicial rem-
edies necessitated by the problems of racial discrimination in union
membership.57
HENRY E. FRYE
Following this case, the Wisconsin statute was rewritten so as to provide
for enforcement powers. Wis. Laws 1957, ch. 266. For a discussion of the new
law, see, Comment, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 294.
"' See note 52 supra.
" The Marinship case, supra note 48, involved a closed shop in conjunction with
a closed or partially closed union. The court expressly did not pass on the ques-
tion as to "whether or not the union, in absence of a closed shop agreement, would
be required to open its doors to all qualified employees." 25 Cal. 2d 721, 745, 155
P.2d 329, 342 (1944). The Texas case is distinguishable because it involved the
maintenance of two separate but self-governing locals. Davis v. Brotherhood of
Ry. Carmen of America, supra note 51. In the Wisconsin case, the bricklayers
union was not the statutory bargaining agent for the persons seeking admittance.
Ross v. Ebert, supra note 52. This distinguishes it from the Betts and Oliphant
cases, where the plaintiffs were members of the class which the union had a
statutory duty to represent.
161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946). See note 50 spra.
The courts are quite correct in holding that the statutory bargaining agent
has a duty to represent fairly those within the unit for whom it bargains, even
though they are not members of the union. However, the weakness of the rationale
of these cases is in the tacit assumption that the duty of fair representation does
not, of itself, require equal participation in union membershp. The most obvious
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